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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  APPOINTMENT,  COMPOSITION  AND  TERMS  OF  REFERENCE  OF  THE  COMMITTEE 
The Committee entrusted with the  investigation  of the incidence  of various  systems  of 
taxation  on the  common  market  was  set  up  under Order  No.  1-53 of  5th  March  1953  (1) 
of the High Authority of the European Coal  and Steel  Community. 
This Order defined the composition and terms of reference of the Committee as  follows: 
"Article  1 
"A Committee shall be  set up consisting of a chairman and three  members. The 
chairman  shall  have  a  casting  vote.  The  Committee  will  be  assisted  by  six  experts 
selected from among the nationals of the  six countries of the Community. 
"The chairman and the members of the Committee, together with the six  experts 
who  are to  assist  them,  shall be  appointed  by  Order of  the  Authority. 
"Article 2 
"The terms of reference of the Committee are defined as follows: 
"The  Treaty  establishing  the  Community  has  created  a  common  market  for 
coal  and  steel  among  the  six  member  countries,  but  has  allowed  different  'systems 
of taxation and different taxes to remain extant in these  countries. 
"In  the  circumstances  thus  defined  it  is  deemed  desirable  to  consider  means 
for  facilitating  the  unhampered movement  of  products  on the  common  market,  whilst 
obviating the superposing of taxes of the  same type  levied  by different  states. 
"Consequently, the High Authority requests the Committee of experts to examine 
the  following  questions,  as  they  arise  under  existing  circumstances  in  respect  of  coal 
and  steel: 
"1.  Having  regard  to  the  dissimilarities  in  the  turnover taxes  levied  in the  various 
countries  of the  Community ("Umsatzsteuer" in  Germany,  "Taxe de  transmission"  in 
Belgium,  "Taxes a la production et sur les  transactions" in France,  "I.G.E." in Italy, 
"Impot sur le chiffre d'affaires" in Luxembourg, "Omzetbelasting" in the Netherlands), 
what would  be the economic effects on the operation of  the common market: 
"a)  of  a  system  which,  by  exemptions for  exports  and compensating  duties  on 
imports,  would  result  in  the  products  being  liable  to  turnover  tax  only  in 
the country of  destination~ 
"b)  of  a  system  under  which  the  products,  wherever  they  might  be  delivered 
within  the  common  market would  be  liable  only  to  the  turnover  taxes  of 
the country of  origin? 
"2.  What are the turnover taxes (these should be shown in the form of a comparative 
table) and the systems of exemptions on exports and of compensating duties on imports 
which are in force  in the various  countries  of  the  Community? 
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"3.  What are the effects on the  prices both of the home-produced products  and the 
products  imported from  the  other  countries  of  the  Community,  of the  practices  now 
being followed  with  regard to  turnover taxes? 
(The effects  should be illustrated by examples  drawn from the practice  in  the  various 
countries.) 
"4.  Are there any  cases  where  a  product benefits  by  exemptions  or refunds,  when 
exported  from  its  country  of  origin,  which  are  greater or lesser  in  amount  than  the 
turnover  taxes  to  which  the  same  product is  liable  when  sold  on  the  home  market? 
"5.  Are  there  any  cases  where  a  product  originating  in  another  country  of  the 
Community  is  liable  to  compensating  duties  which  are  greater  or  lesser  in  amount 
than the turnover taxes to which the corresponding national product is liable? 
"6.  To examine, by means of a  table indicating the designation,  the basis of assess-
ment and the rate of various indirect taxes in the  various countries of the Community, 
to  what  extent  present  practices  with  regard  to  exemption  and  compensating  duties 
are applied to  taxes  other than turnover taxes. 
"Article  3 
"The Committee shall  assemble  such information as  it  may  deem necessary for 
carrying out its work. 
"It must consult  the  views  of  the  Govocnments  of the  six  member  countries, if 
requested  by them to  do  so. 
"Article  4 
"The final  report  of  the  Committee  must  be  drawn  up  by  the  four  experts on 
their  own  responsibility. 
"The  report  must  be  submitted  to  the  High  Authority  not  later  than  lOth 
April  1953. 
"The report will  be published." 
The  following  experts  were  designated  as  chairman,  members,  and  assistants  of  the 
Committee: 
Chairman C): 
Monsieur J.  TINBERGEN,  Professor at the "Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool". Rotterdam: 
Members e): 
Mr.  Leon DuPRIEZ,  Professor at the  University  of  Louvain; 
Mr.  Ferdinanda DI  FENTZIO,  Professor at the University  of Pavia: 
Mr.  Brian REDDAWAY,  Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge. 
Experts  ass.isting  the  Committee (2): 
Mr.  G.  ScHMOLDERS,  Professor at the University of Cologne; 
Mr.  Paul CoART-FRESART,  Professor at the University  of Louvain; 
Mr.  Paul  REUTER,  Professor at the  University  of Aix-en-Provence; 
Mr.  Bruno VISENTIN!,  Professor at the  University  of Urbina; 
Mr.  Ferdinand WIRTGEN,  Director of the "Administration de !'Enregistrement et des Domaines 
du Luxembourg"; 
Mr.  M.  J. H. SMEETS, Professor at the "Katholieke Economische Hogeschool", Tilburg. 
( 1)  Order  No.  2-53 of  5th  March  1953,  Official Ga-:.ette  of the  Community of 7th  March  1953. 
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1.2  MEETINGS  AND  HEARINGS 
In  order  to  carry  out  the  task  assigned  to  it,  the  Committee  held  meetings  on  17th, 
26th,  27th,  28th  and 31st March, and on  1st,  2nd,  3rd, and 8th April,  1953. 
At its first  meeting,  the  Committee settled  the procedure  to  be  followed  for obtaining 
the information necessary for completing its  work.  In particular, it requested the  six  assistant 
experts  to  provide it with all  relevant  data,  for  the  six member countries  of the  Community, 
on  the  questions  raised by  the  High  Authority in  its  Order No.  1-53. It then  informed  the 
Governments of the member countries that, in accordance with paragraph 2,  article 3 of Order 
No.  1-53, it was  prepared to  hear any  of them who  might wish  to  make known their views 
to  the  Committee. 
In  addition,  the Committee issued a  statement to  the press,  and in  the Official Ga;:,ette 
of the Community, to the effect that: 
a)  it would hear such  persons  as  it  might deem  to  be  useful: 
b)  statements in writing might be submitted to it by any  interested  party~ 
c)  producers', workers' and consumers' associations would be heard, if they so  requested, 
provided  that: 
such  organizations  were  included  in  the  lists  submitted  by  the  Governments  in 
connection with the formation of the Consultative Committee; 
the entire area of a  national territory came within  their  scope; 
they had previously submitted a memorandum on matters related to the questions 
with  which  the Committee had to  deal. 
Four  Governments  sent  delegations  to  present  their  views  to  the  Committee,  which 
received them, on 27th March  1953, in  the following order: 
delegation from the Netherlands Government, consisting of Messrs.  KARMELK,  MAAS 
and  HIJZEN; 
delegation from the French Government, consisting of Messrs. ALLIX,  BLOT, THIERRY, 
and a  number  of experts; 
delegation from the German Government, consisting of Messrs.  MEERSMAN,  EHRING, 
MICHAELIS,  and a number of experts; 
delegation from  the  Italian Government,  consisting of Messrs.  STAMMATI,  CosciANI, 
CAMBELL!,  CECCARELLI,  and a number of experts. 
The Committee also  received memoranda from  the French and German Governments. 
The Belgian and Luxembourg Governments intimated that they did not intend to  submit 
to  the Committee any statements on  their point of view. 
As regards the professional associations,  the following  organizations submitted documents 
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Germany: 
- a  memorandum from  the  "Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahl", Dusseldorf; 
- a  memorandum from  the  "Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau", Essen; 
- a  note  from  the  "Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie", Cologne; 
- a  note  from  the  "Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau", Frankfort on Main; 
- a  teleprinted message from the "Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau", Bochum; 
- a  note  from  the  '"D.G.B.-Bundesvorstand". 
Belgium: 
France: 
a  memorandum from  the  "Federation des  Associations Charbonniercs de Belgique"; 
a  memorandum  from  the  "Comite de la Sidcrurgie Beige". 
a  memorandum from  the  "Chambre Syndicale de la Siderurgie Franc;aise"; 
a  memorandum from  the  "Charbonnages de  France"; 
a  note  from  M.  METRAL,  as  President  of  the  "Syndicat  National  des  Industries 
Mecaniques et Transformatrices des Metaux", Paris; 
a  note  from  the  "Conseil National du Patronat Franc;ais"; 
a  note  from  the  "Association Technique de  !'Importation  Charbonniere". 
In addition. the Committee received a note and several documents from Senator ARMEN-
GAUD,  Paris.  Later, the Committee invited M.  ARMENGAUD,  and such of  the  above mentioned 
organizations  as  had notified  their wish  to  do  so,  to  appear  before  it  on  31st March  1953. 
They were  heard in  the following  order: 
a)  delegation  from  the  "Chambre Syndicale  de  la Siderurgie Franc;aise",  consisting  of 
Messrs.  FERRY,  PAYEN,  HENRY; 
b)  delegation from the "Charbonnages de France", Cbnsisting of Messrs. BRET,  GARDENT, 
BAYLE; 
c)  delegation  from  the  "Syndicat  National  des  Industries  Mecaniques  et Transforma· 
trices de Metaux", consisting of Messrs.  METRAL  and JoLY; 
d)  Senator  ARMENGAUD; 
e)  Mr.  GANSER,  delegate  of  the  "Bundesverband der Deutschen  lndustrie''; 
delegation from the "Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie", consisting 
of Messrs.  MoMMSEN,  ScHUBERT,  WILLE,  FLUME,  and a  number of experts; 
Mr.  STRATER,  delegate  of  the  '"Industriegewerkschaft Metall"; 
f)  Mr.  PLATTE,  delegate of the "lndustriegewerkschaft Bergbau"; 
delegation of the "Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau", consisting of Messrs. GROSSE, 
VAN  DER FELDE,  MULLER. 
1.3  GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS 
In spite of the limited  time  at its  disposal,  the  Committee  believes  that the data  with 
which it was furnished  by the  six  experts who  assisted it,  together with  the additional inform-
ation  obtained during  the  hearings  and from  the  study of  the  numerous  documents  which  it 
received,  have provided sufficient information to enable  answers to  be given  to  the questions 
raised by the High Authority in its  Order No.  1-53. 
>I' REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF TAXES  11 
The following  chapters contain  the answers  to  these  questions  and an  analysis  of  the 
two  systems of taxation, a and b,  described on page 7, which were submitted to the Committee. 
Although  the entire  responsibility  for  this  report falls  on the Committee,  it  submitted  drafts 
of its report to the six assistant experts, in order to benefit by their comments. The Committee's 
final  conclusions were  unanimous. 
In the  course  of its  work  the  Committee  met  with  questions  which  proved  to  be  of 
importance for the  problems  under investigation,  particularly  the  difference  between  the  type 
of  turnover tax in France and in  the other countries  of  the  Community.  The French system 
is  based on  a  different principle from that of the other systems,  in  the  sense  that it  is  a  tax 
on the value added and not a  multi-stage  tax.  Furthermore,  attention  should be  drawn  to  the 
effects  which result from  the method of levying the tax that is  employed in  France.  Although 
the order setting up the Committee makes no direct reference to  such questions, the Committee 
considered that it should carry out an analysis, as  this would help to throw further light on  the 
problems which  it was  its function  to  clarify. 
In  the  final  chapter  of  its  report,  which  summarizes  its  conclusions,  the  Commilte::: 
has included some observations on problems of a  more general character which it has encoun-
tered in the course of its investigations. 
The answers to  the  questions have been  set  out in  the following  manner: 
Chapter  II  contains  some  definitions  of  the  basic  concepts  connected  with  the 
problems  raised.  In  Chapter  III,  some  facts  and  calculations  on  the  incidence  of  turnover 
taxes  are outlined. From these figures  it is  possible  to  determine what the  Committee prefers 
to  describe as  the  primary consequences of any  particular change  in  the taxation system,  that 
is  to say the change in the fiscal charges due to  a modification of the taxes under consideration. 
The primary consequences  are followed  by  two  groups of adaptations: 
a  partial  adaptation,  that  is  to  say,  an  adaptation  to  the  new  conditions  in  the 
market under consideration. This question is  also discussed in chapter  III~ 
adaptations of a  more general nature,  arising  in  the industries  using  coal  and  steel 
as well as in the national economy as a whole, and even in the international economy. 
The  importance  of  these  adaptations  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  involve  changes 
in  the  use of  productive  resources,  which  must  be  examined.  These  problems  are 
dealt  with  in  chapter  IV,  which  also  contains  an  examination  of  the  methods  of 
assessment. 
Here and now,  the Committee desires  to  lay particular emphasis on  the fact  that  there 
is  a  marked difference between the  final changes, resulting, for example, from the introduction 
of system  a  or of system  b,  and  its  immediate effects,  which  cari  be  mitigated,  if  necessary, 
by  temporary  measures. CHAPTER  II 
BASIC  CONCEPTIONS 
2.1  INTERNATIONAL  MARKET;  TAXATION  AT  THE  FRONTIERS;  THE  DIFFERENT  CONCEPTS  OF 
PRICE 
An international  market  for  any given  commodity  may  be  described  in  terms  of  the 
various  sellers  and  buyers,  who  are  situated in  different  localities,  so  that  transport  charges 
are  involved~ of  the  taxes  imposed,  particularly turnover  taxes:  and  of  differences  in  prices. 
A  somewhat closer examination of these various characteristics would  appear to  be  desirable. 
The  mechanism  of  international  transactions  is  made  clear  by  the  diagram  on  the 
following  page.  Two  countries  are  considered  and  are  indicated by  numbers,  country  no.  1 
being  that  of  the  seller,  and  country  no.  2  that  of  the  buyer.  The  seller  fixes  the  selling 
price the amount of which (exclusive of the above-mentioned taxes) we  shall call net producer's 
price, and which is  indicated by p1•  The gross selling  price is  obtained by  adding the  amount 
of these  taxes  to  p 1•  Should  a  refund,  r,  be  made at the frontier,  the  price,  p,  at  the frontier 
wi1l  be correspondingly reduced.  (A tax exemption can be regarded  in  every case as  a  combi-
nation of a tax and a refund.) 
On entry  into  country 2,  the  goods  will  be  liable  to  certain  duties,  c,  and  this  raises 
the  prices.  FinaJly, there  will  be transport charges, v
1
•
2
,  and when these  are  added,  we  obtain 
the price, p
2
,  paid by the purchaser. 
Whereas  the  seller  fixes  his  price  which,  after  addition  and  deduction  of  the  above-
mentioned  sums,  results  in  the  selling  price,  p
2
,  it  is  the  purchaser  who  controls  his  own 
demand, which means, inter alia,  that he has the option of choosing his  suppliers from  among 
a number of competing sellers. His choice will be confined to  those sellers whose total price p
2 
is  the lowest price as far as  he is  concerned. If he  also buys in his  own country (see  diagram, 
national  transaction 2)  the total net price,  p 2 ,  for  that other seller,  after the  national  taxes  t  2 
and the transport charges  v  2  have been added, will also be equal to  p
2
• 
It is  difficult  to  illustrate  the  inter-acting  mechanism  of  the  market  by  means  of  a 
similar diagram, but the table given below does show the way in which this mechanism operates. 
Sellers are grouped horizontally and buyers vertically.  Each division of the table shows  the net 
prices  and the  total  amount,  T,  of the  taxes  and transport charges  in  respect  of  transactions 
between  one  seller  and  one  buyer.  All  the  sales  made  by  one  and  the  same  seller  (e.g., 
x~,  x:,  x~)  are included in  the column referring  to  that  seller~  the purchase made by one 
and the  same buyer are all  shown  on  the  same row.  The principle  of the mechanism is  that 
every buyer only buys  along his  own row  from  the cheapest seller or sellers.  Since  prices are 
fixed  by  each  of  the  sellers,  the  demand  develops  accordingly.  If that  demand  is  not  in 
equilibrium with the  supply,  price  adjustment will  take place until equilibrium  is  established. 
A  similar  price  adjustment  will  be  necessary  after  each  change  in  the  prevailing 
conditions, e.g.,  when  a new  system of taxation or a  common market is  introduced. It is  only 
after the producers' net prices have been adjusted in this  way  that it will  be possible to deter-
mine  the consequences  of such  a  change  in  prevailing  conditions. 
It should  be  pointed  out  that  every  market  for  a  given  commodity  has  numerous 
contacts  with other markets:  inter alia,  through the existence  of a  certain wage  level,  the rate 
of  exchange  etc.  Every  change  in  the  conditions  relating  to  a  particular  market  will  result 
in a change in the general equilibrium, either at once, or after a certain time-interval. DIAGRAM  SHOWING  FORMATION  OF  PRICES 
AFTER  THE  ADJUSTMENT  OF  PRICES 
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Table  illustrating formation  of prices 
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2.2  CHARACTERISTIC  FEATURES  OF  A  COMMON  MARKET 
The aim of a  common  market is  to supply  requirements  as cheaply  as  possible,  that 
is to say, in such a manner that the quantity demanded is obtained at the lowest possible cost. 
This  aim  can  be  achieved  by  those  very  features  which  are  characteristic  of  a  common 
market  where: 
I.  the  net prices  quoted  by  a  given  seller  at  any  particular point of  dispatch  are  the 
same for all buyers; 
2.  every  buyer  invariably  chooses  the  seller  whose  price.  as  far  as  he  is  concerned. 
is  the lowest at  the point  of  delivery. 
These prerequisites of a  common market are laid down  in the  provisions of the Treaty, 
particularly  in  articles  2,  3,  4  and  60.  Article  2,  paragraph  2  and  article  3c  refer  to  the 
establishment  of  conditions  which  will  ensure  by  themselves  the  most  rational  division  of 
production  at  the  highest  possible level  of productivity,  and  the  establishment  of  the lowest 
possible  prices.  As  the  conception  of  what constitutes  the  lowest  price  is  not  clearly  defined 
in  the Treaty, it must be elucidated from  the  relevant provisions. 
Article  4  prohibits  measures  or  practices  which  hamper  the  buyer  in  the  free  choice 
of  his  supplier;  this  implies  that  all  the  sellers  must  be in  a  position  to  reach  every  buyer. 
Article  4  also  prohibits  measures  or  practices  discriminating  between  producers,  between 
buyers,  and  between  consumers. 
Article  60  represents  a  very  important  application  of  these  principles.  It  prohibits 
discriminatory  practices  involving  the  application  by  a  seller  of  unequal  conditions  to 
comparable  transactions.  It stipulates  that  the  price-lists  shall  be  made  public,  and  makes 
the  choice  of  the  geographical  basing-point  on  which  the  price-lists  are  established  subject . 
to  the control  of the  High  Authority.  Article  60  does,  however,  - within  any  limits  which 
may  be  determined  by  the  High  Authority  - permit  the  seller  to  grant  rebates  from  his 
basic  price  schedule to  an extent which will  enable  him to  quote  a  price equal  to  that given 
in another producer's schedule,  related to  a  different  basing-point,  which  offers  the. buyer the 
best  terms  at  the  point  of  delivery.  The producer  is,  however,  prohibited  from  aligning  his 
offer in  an upward direction. 
By  this  means,  the  Treaty guarantees  to  every  buyer  access,  under  equal  conditions, 
to  all  the  sellers  who  wish  to  sell  to  him.  On the  other hand,  it  affords  the  producers,  the 
buyers  and  the  consumers  no  guarantee  against  the  differences  which  arise  from  their  geo-
graphical  location,  and  more  particularly  against  the  differences  in  factor  costs;  it  only 
prohibits inequalities arising  from discriminatory measures. 
We  have  already pointed out that, if the common market is  to  function  properly,  it is 
essential that every  buyer  invariably  selects  the  seller  who,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned,  is  the 
cheapest at the point of delivery.  In order that the aim of the common market should not be 
frustrated,  tax  considerations  must  not intervene  to  induce  the  buyer  to  alter  his  decisions. 
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2.3  METHODS  OF  APPLYING  SYSTEMS  A  AND  B 
In order to  ensure an exact comparison of the  two  systems  to  which  reference is  made 
in  the  Order of the  High Autority setting up the  Committee, it  should  be  pointed  out,  that 
it  is  possible for  system a,  which  is  only defined in general terms  in  the Order,  to  be  applied 
in  various  ways. 
In  what  follows,  we  shall  use  the  term  "ideal  version  of  system  a"  for  the  case  in 
which  there is  no  difference between: 
I.  the amount of the  exemption  or refund and the  total  turnover  tax  included  in  the 
price, and between 
2.  the compensating  duty  at the  point of entry and the total  turnover tax included  in 
the  price  of a  comparable  product in  the  country  of destination. 
The other types  of  system  a  are  characterized  by  differences  between  the  magnitudes 
compared  above:  the  exemptions  and  compensating  duties  are  not  equal  to  the  total  sum 
of the taxes in  question because it is  technically impossible to determine their  total  incidence. 
The technical difficulties which prevent the  determination of the total incidence are due: 
to the multi-stage nature of the majority of these  taxes~ 
- to  the  fact  that,  even  where  no  multi-stage  system  is  in  operation,  it  is  difficult 
to  refund all  the taxes included in the price. 
In view  of these  unavoidable  defects,  it  is  advisable  to  consider also  some  other  type 
of  system  a  which  is  more  readily  workable  than  the  ideal  version.  For  this  purpose,  the 
Committee has  taken a  system a'  where  the tax  exemption is  applied  to  the final  transaction 
and  the  amount of  compensating  duty  corresponds  to  the  normal  rate  of  tax.  It  must  be 
pointed  out,  however,  that,  as  far  as  France is  concerned,  this  system  also  involves  certain 
difficulties due to  the method of levying the tax on production. 
System  b  does  not  call  for  a  similar  study  because,  under  this  system,  all  the  taxes 
affecting  the price in  the country of origin are retained. CHAPTER Ill 
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF  TURNOVER TAX 
AND  THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF  THE INTRODUCTION 
OF  SYSTEMS A  OR  B 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
With the help of its experts, the Committee assembled as  much information as possible 
on  the  present  forms  of  turnover  tax  in  the  six  member countries.  This  tax,  under  various 
names, exists in each of the countries.  In order to  prepare a  comparative table,  in  accordance 
with the request contained in the Order setting up the Committee, cases which were as concrete 
as  possible had to  be selected,  and the following  products,  which  are subject to  the  authority 
of  the  E.C.S.C.  were  chosen:  coal,  coke,  billets  (as  representative  of  crude  steel),  and  hot 
drawn  sheet  steel of less  than 3 mm  thickness  (as typical  of processed  steel). 
The exact incidence of the tax does not follow immediately from the definition of these 
products,  since  that  incidence  is  affected  by other factors  such  as,  for  example,  the  number 
of previous  transactions (which  depends  on  the extent to  which  the  producing  enterprises  are 
integrated),  the  type  of  delivery  (for  example  whether  made  by  a  producer  or by  a  dealer). 
etc.  Wherever  these  details  do  not  interfere  with  the  clearness  of  the  tables,  an endeavour 
has  been  made to  include  them. 
The Committee regarded it as  advisable to  include some estimates of the total incidence 
of the tax, since evaluations of that incidence are often too low,  and because somewhat widely 
diverging  opinions  exist as  to  the extent of that incidence. 
We are dealing here with the total incidence which consists of: 
a)  the  tax  paid  at  the  "final  stage"  (sale)  of  the  product; 
b)  the  tax  paid  the  "penultimate  stage"  (for  raw  materials  as  well  as  for  any  other 
supplies  of  goods  and/or  services  which  have  been  taxed),  and 
c)  the  tax  on  all  the  "previous  stages"  affecting  the  price  of  the  products  at  the 
.. penultimate  stage".  Basically,  we  are  dealing  with  an  infinite  series  of taxes  the 
total extent of which can be estimated by means of approximative formulae. 
Many estimates  made  in  actual  practice  take no  account  of  this  third  component,  so 
that  they  are  not  comparable  with  more  accurate  estimates.  When  the  calculation  stops  at 
the  "penultimate stage",  indicated under  b,  the  answer  is  certainly  nearer  to  the  true  value 
than  when  the  amount  of  tax  in  the  final  stage  is  alone  considered,  but  it  is  nevertheless 
below  the true figure. 
3.2  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  OF  TURNOVER  TAXES  AND  OF  EXEMPTIONS,  REFUNDS,  AND  COM-
PENSATING  IMPORT  DUTIES 
Tables lA, IB, IIA and liB C), drawn up for coal, coke,  billets and sheets, respectively, 
comprise  the  information  which  has  been  assembled  and  are  self-explanatory.  They  reveal 
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above  all  the  important  difference  between  France  and  the  other  member  countries.  This 
difference  exists  in  respect  of  both  the  level  and  the  nature  of  the  tax.  Whereas  the  other 
countries use  the multi-stage  system,  with  some more or less  important exceptions for certain 
goods  and  transactions,  the  French  tax  includes  a  very  important  component  of  a  non-
cumulative  character,  the  normal  rate  of which  amounts  to  15,35 % and  is  applied  to  the 
"price including tax'2..  It corresponds to a rate of more than 18%  if applied to the "price before 
tax". The method of levying the tax is  also different from that employed in the other countries, 
in the sense that, at every stage,  the tax is  calculated on the basis of the value of the product, 
but the tax paid on the raw materials and on certain other classes of ancillary supplies delivered 
at previous  stages  is  refunded.  This is  the  most important of the complications;  but there are 
others,  as  will  be  evident  from  the  tables.  The  taxation  systems  in  Italy  and  Luxembourg 
are the simplest;  but these are also  the countries  where the rates  under the main  schedule arc 
the lowest.  The German, Belgian  and Netherlands systems,  which  all  apply  roughly  the  same 
rates,  occupy an intermediate position,  but they embody a  large number of minor differences 
which are shown in the tables. 
In  order to  calculate  the  total  incidence  of  the  turnover  taxes  for  the  four  products 
under review,  we  had to  work on  the basis of certain assumptions,  namely: 
1.  assumptions  concerning  the  proportion  of  the  cost  price  represented  by  taxable 
materials and  services  in  the  "penultimate stage" and in  the "previous  stages"; 
2.  assumptions concerning the extent to  which the industries in  question are integrated. 
As  regards  the  first group  of assumptions,  the  Committee  assumed  the  percentages of 
taxable materials  and services  included in  the cost  price to  be  the  same in  each country. 
For the  second  group of assumptions  the  Committee  did  not wish  to  confine  itself,  in 
respect  of coke  and  sheet  steel,  to  the  case  of  a  non-integrated  industry;  the  results  of cal-
culations  for  an integrated industry  have,  therefore,  been  added  at the foot  of each of these 
tables. 
Some  general remarks  must  also  be made  on  the  total  incidences  shown  in  the tables 
which,  for  the  "previous  stages",  have  been  calculated  by  means  of  an  infinite  geometrical 
series (1).  From  its  very  nature,  the  infinite  series  gives  results  which  are  a  little  too  high. 
Moreover,  the rates  of multi-stage taxes  are  hardly ever  absolutely  uniform - certain  trans-
actions  are  sometimes  liable  to  a  lower  rate  of  tax,  or  are  not  taxed  at  all -, whereas 
the  infinite  series  presupposes  absolute  uniformity,  and  also  assumes  that  the  "previous 
stages"  were  completed  in  the  same  country.  The  result  of  the  calculation  is,  therefore, 
somewhat too high on this  account,  but the proportion of 50 % for the taxable materials  and 
services  in  the  "previous  stages",  which  has  been  used  in  making  the  calculations,  is  a 
conservative estimate and thus tends to give  a low figure.  Since these tendencies act in opposite 
directions,  the  Committee  considers  that  the  figures  which  have  been  calculated  present  a 
realistic picture, and that they are reasonably comparable for  the  five  countries  which employ 
a multi-stage system. 
The method  of  calculating  the incidences  of  taxation  cannot  be  the  same  for  France 
as for  the other countries, because its  taxation system is  different.  The Committee has studied 
the numerous data placed at its  disposal by  the French Government and by French industries 
(1)  The incidence of the "previous stages"  amounts to  ab  l~b ,  where: 
a  = the  percentage  of raw  materials  and  services  liable  to  tax,  which  is  included  in  the  final  price  (ex-
clusive of tax); 
b = this  percentage  in  the  cost price  of these  raw  materials and services themselves; and 
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and believes that it has arrived at results for France which are comparable with the incidences 
calculated for the other countries. 
3.3  OTHER  TAXES  FOR  WHICH  THERE  ARE  EXEMPTIONS  OR  REFUNDS 
A  study of the systems in  force  in  the member countries has  shown that,  as far as  the 
products  of the  E.C.S.C.  are concerned,  there  is  no  other  tax  of  any  importance  for  which 
exemptions  or refunds  are  granted. 
3.4  EFFECT  OF  PRESENT  PRACTICES  ON  PRICES 
The effect of current practices on prices can be explained as  follows:  The selling  price 
, in  country  2  of  products  originating  in  country  l  differs  from  that  current  in  country  l, 
leaving transport charges out of account, in  two  ways:  there is  a  difference between  the  taxes, 
and  there  is  also  a  difference  between  the  refunds  and  the  compensating  duties.  The  tables 
provide  the  figures  which  are  necessary  for  calculating  this  dual  difference  fer  the  products 
under review. 
The table below gives  some examples: 
TABLE  III 
Incidence  of present  practices  as  regards  exemption  and compensating  duty  on  certain  prices 
Product 
Producer country 
Consumer country 
1.  Incidence  of the  taxes (1)  in 
country. 
- 2.  Exemption + refunds 
+ 3.  Compensating duty 
1-2+3. 
-- 4.  [ncidence  of the  taxes (1)  in 
country. 
Difference 1 - 2 + 3 - 4 
(1)  Turnover taxes  only. 
(calculated as a  percentage  of the producer's net price, assuming 
that there are 110  transport charges) 
Billets  Coal 
France  G  F  G 
Germany  F  G  F 
the  producer 
+ 29  9,8  14  7,4 
19,6  -4,7  7,9  4,7 
+  4  20  +  4  8 
13,4  25,1  10,1  10,7 
the  consumer 
9,8  29  7,4  14 
3,6  - 3,9  2,7  - 3,3 
Table  IV,  which  shows  the  effect  of  present  practices  in  regard  to  exemption  and 
compensating duty on the price of billets  (in  round figures)  was  compiled  from  data for  the 
six countries similar to  those given in table Ill for  the French and German products. 20  EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 
TABLE IV 
Comparative  table  showing  the  current  incidence  of turnover  taxes on  billets 
(in  %  of the  producer's net price,  assuming that there  are  no 
transport charges) 
~ 
Germany  Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
l 
n 
Germany  10  9  13,5  8  7  9 
Belgium 
I 
9,5  10  14  8,5 
I 
7,5 
I 
9,5 
France 
I 
25  25  I 
29  24 
I 
23 
I 
25 
It is  of interest to note that, in  present circumstances, the indirect charges which cannot 
be recovered when  the goods are exported are heavier in France than in the  other countries, 
in spite of the "value-added" system. 
3.5  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  INTRODUCTION  OF  SYSTEMS  A  AND  B  WHEN  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
IS  ESTABLISHED 
The introduction of one of  the systems under discussion, when the common market is 
established, is  equivalent to superposing two changes almost simultaneously: 
1.  the  establishment of  the  common  market,  which  means  the  abolition  of  customs 
duties and dual prices, and 
2.  the change in the amount of the refunds  and compensating  duties in so  far as the 
new system introduced  differs  from  the  existing  system. 
The Committee was  not asked to  examine the first of these  two  changes.  The Treaty 
provides for temporary measures of safeguard in cases where the change would have a harmful 
effect  on  the  stability  of  the  markets.  Any  such  disturbance  of  the  equilibrium  might  be 
increased or counterbalanced by the change in  the  tax  system. lt would  be wrong, however, 
to select the system on the basis of the combined effect of changes (1) and (2). 
Consequently, the effects of these systems of taxation themselves must also be examined. 
The introduction of one of these two  systems  would lead to changes in the prices  quoted  to 
buyers  to  the  extent  by  which  it  deviates  from  existing  conditions.  These  changes  will  be 
termed primary changes~ they will result in changes in the relative positions of different sellers. REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF TAXES  21 
The result will  be that, for  sellers  who  are favoured,  the  market will  expand,  whereas 
for sellers who are placed at a disadvantage, the market will shrink. The latter would, therefore, 
endeavour  to  reduce  the  net  prices  of  their  product,  in  order  to  offset  the  changes  which 
have occurred, thus making a readjustment which we  propose to call a secondary readjustment; 
in so  doing,  they are restricted by the  economic laws which govern the firm's  operations. 
In  the  case of  a  true  common  market,  this  price  adjustment  would  be  the  same  for 
all  the  buyers  from  the  same  seller.  In  a  common  market  as  defined  by  the  Treaty,  other 
possibilities  arise,  owing  to  the  powers  conferred by article  60,  2b.  The figures  in the  tables 
indicate the primary consequences  which result from  the change in the  system,  that is  to  say, 
the  consequences  which  arise  before  any  adjustment  of  the  producers'  net  prices  has  taken 
place.  Some examples, given  in  round figures,  are  to  be  found  in the  following  table: 
TABLE  V 
Primary consequences  of introducing system  a  (ideal  version)  and system  b  for  certain prices 
Product 
Producer country 
Purchasing country 
(percentage  of  net  price  of  product,  assuming  that  there  art: 
no transport charges) 
Billets  Coal 
France  G  F  G 
Germany  F  G  F 
Taxes e),  exemptions,  refunds  and compensation 
payments at present  13,5  25  10  11 
System a (ideal version)  .  10  29  7,5  14 
System b,  29  10  14  7,5 
(•)  Turnover tax only. 
From Table IV all  available  information  on  this  point  may be obtained in  respect  of 
billets. Under system a all figures in the same line (e.g.  in the first line:  country of destination-
Germany) will  be replaced by  the  boxed figure  (i.e.  the figure  which at present  applies  solely 
to  purchases  of German origin).  Under system  h,  on  the~  other  hand,  all  figures  in  the  same 
column will  be replaced by the boxed figure  in  this  column. 22  EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 
When system a' is  used (see chapter II),  the  result is  that  shown  in  table VI: 
- -· 
Country of  '~ 
~  Country 
~  of destin at 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
TABLE VI 
Comparison  of the  incidences  of turnover  tax on  billets 
under  the  present system  and  under  system  a' 
Germany 
10 
10 
9,5 
10 
25 
25 
8 
8,5 
7 
7,5 
9 
9,5 
(in  percentages  of the  producer's  net  price  and  assuming  that 
there are  no transport charges).  The first  figure  in  each  square 
gives  the  present  situation,  while  the  second  shows  the  result 
of adopting system a'  (1) 
Belgium  France  Italy  Luxembourg  Netherlands 
9  13,5  8 
I 
7  9 
9  13,5  8  7  10 
10  14  8,5 
I 
7,5  9,5 
10  14  8,5  7,5  10 
25  29  24 
I 
23  25 
24,5  29  23,5  22,5  25 
8  12  7 
I 
6  8 
8  12  7  6  8,5 
7  11,5  6 
I 
5  7 
7  11.5  6  5  7,5 
9  13,5  8 
I 
7  10 
9  13,5  8  7  10 
It is  assumed that in the case of France the same tax exemption on exports is  applied under system a' as at present. -, 
CHAPTER IV 
BASIC  EFFECTS  OF SYSTEMS A AND BON THE OPERATION 
OF THE COMMON MARKET 
4.1  GENERAL  ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE 
After  the  brief  description  of  the  existing  situation  and  of  the  primary  effects  of 
introducing  a  new  system  of  taxation  given  in  the  preceding  chapter,  an  analysis  of  the 
further  consequences of the  different systems of taxation will  be  given  in  the  present chapter, 
with  a  view,  particularly, to  seeing  how  far  these  systems  will  help  or hinder  the  attainment 
of  the  fundamental  objective  of  the  Community,  i.e.  the  establishment  of  conditions  which 
will  ensure  by  themselves  the  most rational  division  of production.  Such  an  analysis  cannot 
be  confined to the consideration of  the  coal and steel  sectors,  for the  simple  reason  that  the 
transactions  in  these  commodities  between  the  different  members  of  the  Community  affect 
both their balances of payments and the exchange rate, or the cost of the factors  of production 
in  the individual countries.  All  these factors  in  turn have an  effect  on the relative competitive 
power of  the various producers  in  the  member States  of  the  Community.  The exchange  rate 
is, of course, also  affected  by transactions in other commodities, and the problem which arises 
has, therefore, to be considered as an integral part of the overall general problem of establishing 
a  system  which  will  help  to  produce  the  best  allocation  of  the  productive  resources  of  all 
kinds  throughout the countries  belonging  to  the Community. 
More specifically, we want to consider which system of taxation would produce the least 
distortion of the  pattern of production  and  trade which  would  be established  in  the  absence 
of  taxes  or,  more  exactly,  in  the  absence  of  taxes  which  would  introduce  on  the  supply 
side  an element  which  would  distort  the  assessment  of  relative  real  costs  of  production.  In 
doing so,  the Committee has considered it essential to  study the full  effects of these alternative 
systems,  including  the  effect  on  the  equilibrium  rate  of  exchange;  and  it  has  considered  it 
useful to  bring under review  all  sorts  of  taxes,  direct or indirect. 
4.2  TAXES  ON  SPECIFIC  COMMODITIES 
It is  perhaps easier to  start with  taxes  on specific  commodities,  such as  cigarettes.  For 
these taxes all  countries adopt system a  which  provides for  a  refund (drawback) of the tax if 
the  cigarettes  are exported  (or  an  exemption  if the  tax  has  not  yet  been  paid),  and  a  com-
pensating duty  on  imported cigarettes. 
The main reasons for adopting a system of this kind would appear to  be the following: 
a)  Selling prices in foreign markets are,  in general, "given",  whether we  measure them 
before  payment  of  foreign  taxes  (which  is  relevant  in  this  examination)  or after. 
b)  The  country  wants  its  factors  of  production  to  flow  into  those  lines  of  export 
production which  will give  the country the best return. 24.  EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 
c)  If the  exporters of cigarettes  had to  pay the excise  duty  to  their Government,  the 
factors  would  clearly  avoid this  type  of  export production in favour  of others with 
no  excise,  even  though both gave  the  same  national  return.  The need  for  a  com-
pensating  duty on imports follows  for  similar reasons. 
4.3  INDIRECT  TAXES  OF  A  GENERAL  NATURE 
The adoption of system  a  for  the specific  taxes  mentiOned  above has  led  some people 
to  the  conclusion  that  these  same  arguments  would  prove  that  system  a  was  also  the  only 
correct  one  for  all  kinds  of  indirect'  taxes.  So  far,  however,  as  a  general  tax  is  concerned, 
such as the general turnover tax, at a flat  rate, these arguments do not apply. If the tax applied 
to  exports,  as  well  as  to  sales  in  the  home  market,  the  producers  of  all  commodities  might 
appear  to  be  at  a  "competitive  disadvantage"  in  the  foreign  markets;  but  the  equilibrium 
could be restored, in  relation to  the position adopted under system  a,  by a lowering of factor 
prices  in  terms  of  foreign  currency,  e.g.  if  the  rate  of  exchange  were  lower  than  that  used 
under  system  a,  or if  there  were  a  relative  reduction  in  factor  prices.  So  far  as  long-term 
static equilibrium is  concerned, the  only  difference  between  systems a and  b  would be  in  the 
exchange rate;  in either case the operation of procuring goods for the home market by  means 
of foreign  trade would bear the turnover tax once, apd once only, just like the direct production 
for  that market.  Under system a  the tax  comes when  the imports arrive,  and under system  b 
when the exports leave. 
In  amplification  of  the  preceding  point.  the  words  "competitive  disadvantage"  or 
"higher or lower production costs", etc.  hm·e  no meaning as  between countries, unless we  can 
produce  an  exchange  rate;  if  the  tax  system under  b  raises  all  the  exporters'  costs  in  local 
currency compared with that under system a,  and lowers  the costs  of imported goods  to  the 
consumer by having no compensating duty, equilibrium  will  require a  different exchange  rate, 
which will restore the balance. What an exchange rate cannot do, is  to offset unequal additions 
to  the  costs  of different  export  commodities  (due  to  varying  excise  duties,  etc.):  equilibrium 
in  the  balance  of payments  is  of  course  possible  under  such  a  system,  but  the  pattern  of 
production and trade will  have been distorted from  the "ideal". System a  makes  the additions 
due  to  excise  duties equal  - all  being  zero.  The important  point,  however,  is  not  that they 
arc ;:.ero,  but they are equal. 
4.4  DIRECT  TAXES 
So  far  as  "direct  taxes"  such  as  income  tax  are  concerned,  these  are  usually  general 
in  the sense  that they apply to  all  industries alike. 
All  countries  apply  system  b  in  regard  to  these  taxes,  making  no  attempt  to  refund 
the  taxes  when  goods  are  exported  and  imposing  no  "compensating  duty"  when  goods  arc 
imported. This system produces no distortions because it applies  to  all  commodities alike. 
It is, perhaps, of some theoretical interest in connection with the last paragraph to  note 
that, if one particular industry were made to  pay a  specially high income tax,  strictly speaking 
the  country ought  to  give  a  "refund'' on all  products  of  that  industry  which  were  exported 
to compensate for  the specially high  tax,  and also  to  impose a compensating duty  on imports 
of such products. The calculation  of the amounts would, of course, be extremely difficult. 
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So  far  as  a  direct tax is  concerned,  one  might  also  say  that it would  be  theoretically 
possible for  the  countries to  adopt system  a  in  respect  of  all  commodities.  A  refund  would 
then  have  to  be given,  in  respect  of  all  exports, of the  direct taxes  paid as  a  result  of their 
production,  and  a  compensating  duty  applied  to  all  imports.  If  such  a  procedure  could  be 
adopted,  system a  would be  as  good as  system  b,  in  the  sense  of  not creating  distortions.  It 
goes without saying, however,  that the use of system  b is  much simpler  so  far  as  direct taxes 
are  concerned,  which  explains  why  all  countries follow  this  course. 
4.5  SUMMARY 
The  conclusions  which  emerge  from  the  foregoing  analysis  may  be  summarized  as 
follows:  if  distortions are to  be avoided,  then each country should observe the following  rules: 
1.  For  "particular"  taxes  which  apply  only  to  particular  industries  or  which  apply 
to  them  with  very  uneven weight,  it should  adopt  system  a. 
2.  For a "general" tax whether direct or indirect, the countries can adopt either system a 
or system  b,  but they must apply the  same  system to  all  their industries. 
There is  no need for a country to  adopt the same  system for  each one of its "general" 
taxes.  Indeed, it is  most usual for  countries to  follow  system  b for  direct taxes  and  system  a 
(though  only  partially)  for  the general  turnover  tax.  This causes  no  distortions:  what  would 
cause  distortions  is  to  adopt  system  a  for  some  commodities  and  system  .b  for  others,  in 
respect  of the  same  tax. 
If however  all the member countries of  the  Community agreed to adopt the  same  rate 
of  general  turnover  tax,  imposed  on  the  same  basis,  then  distortions  would not  arise,  even 
if  they  applied  system  b  for  transactions  coming  within  the  scope  of  the  Community, whilst 
applying  system  a for  other transactions.  This follows  from  the fact  that the  amount  of  tax 
to  be paid in  respect  of  a  sale  between  the members of the Community  would be  the  same 
under either system - though  there would, of  course, be fiscal consequences,  since  the  taxes 
would  go  to  the  exporting  country  under  system  b.  The Committee  has  thought it  right  to 
draw  the  attention  of  the  High  Authority  to  this  possibility,  but  wishes  to  make  clear  that 
distortions will  be  avoided  only if  the  turnover taxes  are made identical for  all commodities 
in  the six countries. 
So  far as the turnover tax is  concerned, the above analysis  leads to  the conclusion  that 
distortions will  arise  unless  either  the  same  system  is  adopted for  coal and steel as for other 
commodities, or an identical tax with the same rate and the basis is  applied to all commodities 
in  all  member  States.  Since  all  member countries follow  system  a  at least  to  the  extent  that 
the  final  transaction  is  free  of tax  and  a  compensating  duty is  levied  on imports,  the  first 
alternative  for  avoiding  distortions  would  be  almost  equivalent  to  system  a.  The fact  that 
exports bear some part of the  tax (due to  the cumulative principle, which applies in part even 
in France), is  not as  serious as might be feared, since this  applies to  all commodities. It would 
not improve  the  position  to  have  a  special  system  of  more  complete  exemption  or  refund 
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4.6  EXAMPLES  OF  DISTORTIONS:  DIFFERENT  RATES 
i 
It is  helpful  to  illustrate  by  means  of  some  simple  examples  the  types  of  distortion 
which  would  be caused  by  having  a  different  system  for  coal  and  steel  from  that  adopted 
for  other  commodities.  To  reveal  the  essential  point,  we  take  first  a  case  in  which  two 
countries, F  an D, each apply the  salj11e  type of tax - one which  is  not  cumulative  but falls 
on the commodities  only at the final  stage - but that they  have  very  different  rates - say, 
20%  in  F  and 7%  in  D.  Transport costs  are ignored,  and  so  are  transactions  with  the  rest 
of the world.  System  b is  assumed to  apply for coal  and steel,  but system  a for other goods. 
For simplicity  we  write  PF  and Pv  for  the  selling  price  of  any  article  produced in  F  or D 
respectively,  before payment of tax. 
The market ought to work in such a way as to  indicate which goods could be produced 
under the best conditions in  F  and which  in  D.  Under the system  postulated it will,  however, 
give  the following  answers: 
For  coal  and steel:  one must produce in F if PF  +  20%  is less than Pv + 7%. 
For  any other commodity:  one  must  produce  in  F  if  p F  is  less  than  p  D  since  the 
percentage  added for  tax  would  be  the  same for  all  sales 
effected  in  one  country,  i.e.  7%  for  sale  in  D  and  2Wj{, 
for  sale  in  F. 
These  answers  are  quite inconsistent  - the  market  has  been  falsified  and  there  will 
be  an artificial force  leading F  to concentrate its  production on  goods  not  falling  within  the 
scope of the  Community and  to  import its  coal  and  steel  requirements,  whilst  in D  there  is 
an artificial force  in the  opposite  direction.  The disadvantages  of higher direct  taxation  in  D 
are irrelevant in this connection since  they affect  all  products equally.  The trouble arises  from 
the  fact  that the  rules  governing  the  turnover  tax affect  the  commodities unequally. 
The  problem  becomes  particularly  clear  if  we  consider  a  very  simple  product  which 
is  made from steel, but does not fall  within the scope of the Community. If a ton of  nails, for 
example,  costs  only  10 % more  to  produce  than  a  ton  of  wire,  the  prices  which  producers 
in  F  would quote on the market in D  would  be  as  follows: 
Wire  100 + 20%  (tax in  F)  120. 
Nails  110  +  7%  (compensation  duty in  D)  118. 
Thus  a  ton  of  nails  would  be  sold  for  less  than  a  ton  of wire.  If the  wire  produced 
in  F  were  competitive  on  the  market in  D,  it is  clear  that  no  nails  could  be  manufactured 
in  D,  even  though  the  industry  there  might  really  be  very  efficient. 
The difference  between the  tax system  applied  to  wire  and that applied to  nails  would 
have completely distorted the market. 
One  may  add an example  which  would  arise  even  within  the coal  and steel  sector,  if 
the  member countries  continued  to  apply  system  a  in  their  dealings  with  countries  outside 
the  Community,  but system  b  in  their  dealings  with  other  member  countries.  Under  these .. 
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circumstances,  the  price  which  the  two  countries  could  quote  on  an  outside  market  would 
simply be their untaxed price, plus any tax imposed by the foreign  cou~try. Hence the market 
would  indicate that F  was  the better place for  producing  steel  for  export  outside the Com-
munity, if p  were less  than p D even by  as little  as  1 %.  But for  sales within  the  Community 
we  see from  the above example that p  F  would need  to  be  much less than  p  D  ,  since a  higher 
tax would be added (20 % as against 7 %  ).  These answers  are clearly inconsistent: If p  F  were, 
say,  10% less  than  p D,  production  in  F  would  contract  for  sale  within  the  Community  in 
favour  of  D,  but expand for  sale  outside.  The result  would  be  an  absurd  distortion,  caused 
by the adoption  of one system  for  sales  within  the  Community  and  another  system  for  sales 
outside it. 
4.7  EXAMPLES  OF  DISTORTIONS:  DIFFERENT  BASES  OF  ASSESSMENT 
We have just quoted examples of distortions arising from the fact that the  rates would 
not be  the  same  in all  countries if  system  b were  adopted for  transactions  within  the  Com-
munity  and system a for  other transactions.  ' 
Further distortions - or at any rate complications - would be introduced into system h 
by the  existence of  different types of tax:  a  multi-stage  tax in country D, and a  tax on  value 
added  in  country  F.  In  the  latter  country,  the  tax  is  due  only  from  the  purchaser  of  the 
end-product and  is  calculated  on  the  selling  price  of  that  end-product.  The  taxes  levied  on 
intermediate  transactions  are  refunded,  the  recovery  of  the  corresponding  payments  being 
shown  in  the  monthly  statement  issued  to  each  producer  of  the  taxes  paid  by  him  on  the 
raw materials  and services he has  utilized. 
The difficulties  arise from the manner in  which  the tax is  levied,  since it produces dif-
ferent  situations  under  system  b,  according  to  whether  the  product  sold  is  an  end-product, 
e.g.  a rail, or an intermediate product, e.g.  wire. 
For instance, if a  rail produced in  F  is  sold in D, the turnover  tax has been  paid once 
and  for  all.  Again,  on  a  rail  produced  in  D,  the  multi-stage  tax  has  also  been  paid  once 
and  for  all.  The  existence  in  F  of  a  tax  on  the  value  added  thus  produces  no  further 
distortion  than  that  which  we  have  already  seen  in  the  previous  example  to  exist  under 
system b. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  purchaser  domiciled  in  country  F  buying  wire  produced  in  F, 
makes only  an  advance  tax payment which  is  subsequently  refunded.  For example,  a  manu-
facturer of nails pays the final  tax only when the  nails  are  sold,  and the  tax  is  calculated  on 
the price of the  nails~ the advance tax payment made on the purchase of the  wire is refunded, 
and is  thus not part of the price of the wire. 
There are two  consequences of this situation: 
To avoid discrimination, the producer of wire in country F  would have to supply 
the  wire  to  the nail manufacturer in D at the price quoted to the  nail  manufacturer in 
F, and no final  tax may, therefore,  be levied in F  in respect of the  sale  of the wire  to 
the nail manufacturer in  D.  (We do  not discuss  here  the methods by  which  the  refunds 
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For his  part,  the  seller  of wire  in  country D  would,  if  discrimination  is  to  be 
avoided,  have  to  supply  the  wire  to  the  nail  manufacturer in  F  at a  price  free  from 
indirect  taxation,  or otherwise  the  nail  manufacturer  would  pay both  the  foreign  tax 
on his raw  material and then the full  tax levied  by his  own country on the  total value 
of  the  nails;  if  the  nail  manufacturer in  F  were  to  pay  the  producer  in  D  the  price 
inclusive of taxes,  the Government ofF would have to refund to  the nail manufacturer 
in F those taxes which had already been paid in D. 
If, to  avoid discrimination one follows the practices just described system b is no longer 
applied;  if  these  practices  are  ignored  and  system  b  is  strictly  followed  for  both  products, 
the existence in F of a tax on value added, to be borne by the nail manufacturer in Fin respect 
of the  total value of the nails, would create yet another distortion. 
Under system  a,  however,  an  export sale  would  not be affected  by  the  method  of the 
levy. Whether we are dealing with the product in its final stage, or with an intermediate product, 
system  a  causes  no  discrimination  whatsoever. 
The  same consequences  arise from  the method  of levying  the tax on  the value  added 
in  respect of sales outside the Community. 
It may be useful to illustrate the above-mentioned distortions in yet another way. 
Let us  assume that system  b  has  been applied for  a  certain period to  products falling 
within the scope of the Community, while the other products have remained subject to system a, 
and that in this  way a new state of equilibrium has been attained between countries F  and D. 
Starting from this assumption, it is  possible to  ascertain the conditions governing the attainment 
of such a state of equilibrium. 
The equilibrium for the products of the Community is expressed in the following diagram 
by  representing  the gross prices  of  products from  country D  and of products from  country  F 
on an equal level. Under system b the place of sale is  of no importance since the taxes applied 
are solely  those of the country of origin.  Assuming that no freight charges arise,  the producers. 
net prices  are found  by  deducting  the  amount .of  the tax.  To simplify  comparison,  the  taxes 
are given as percentages of the gross prices, i.e.  percentages of the prices including  tax.  A  rate 
inclusive of tax of about 16.5 % corresponds to  20 % exclusive of tax for  country F. as  given 
on page 26,  and a rate of about 6.5 % inclusive of tax corresponds to  a rate of 7 (X,  exclusive 
of tax, as assumed for country D. 
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0 
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In a  state of equilibrium  the net prices  which  will  be received by the  sellers  in  F  will 
thus be 83.5%  of the gross  price,  while  those received  by  the  producers  D  will  be 93.5 <Y,,  of 
the gross price, the difference in  these figures  being due to  variations in the general conditions 
in both countries, such as the exchange-rate etc. 
A  corresponding diagram can be drawn for  the  previously mentioned case  of an  inter-
mediate product falling  within  the scope of the Community on which  the  tax  of country F  is 
refunded to  the user. 
If further  diagrams  are  added  for  those  products  which  do  not  fall  the  scope  of  the 
Community and are also subject to system a,  the following  scheme emerges (the lower sections 
of the diagram have been omitted, since  they  are  identical in  all cases): 
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These diagrams reveal that the assumption of the simultaneous existence of equilibrium 
with system  b  for  products falling  within the  scope of the  Community  and with  system a  for 
other products presupposes arbitrary variations in the relative level of the net prices, according 
to  which  case  is  selected.  In  actual  fact,  such  variations  in  this  level  are  inconceivable  in 
industries which  are close  neighbours  of one another within  a particular country.  In practice, 
the  sellers  for  whom  the  effects  of this  situation  would  mean too  serious  a  handicap  would 
simply  be  excluded  from  the  market.  while  other  sellers  would  enjoy  arbitrary  preference. 
The  variations  in  the  relative level  of  the  net  prices,  as  they  result from  the  diagrams,  thus 
represent so  many distortions. 
4.8  EFFECTS  OF  SYSTEMS  A  AND  B  UNDER  VARYING  TRADE  CONDITIONS 
The analysis  given  above  relates  to  the  effect  of  adopting  ~ystem b  within  the  Com-
munity whilst maintaining system a for other transactions. The results are above all  applicable 
to  long-term developments in the pattern of production. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that.  if  the  rates  of  tax  are  very  different  in  the  various 
countries,  their  competitive  positions  would  be  affected  rather  differently  by  varying  trade 
conditions  according  as  system  a  or  system  b  were  adopted.  These  results  would  apply 
whether or not the  same system were  applied  to  transactions  with other countries  or in  com-
modities  other than  coal  and  steel. 
The  fundamental  reason  for  this  is  that  in  times  of  depressed  trade,  a  producer  will 
try  to  extend  his  market  geographically,  even  if  this  means  receiving  a  smaller  price  after 
deduction of freight.  (As  has  been  mentioned  in  an  earlier  chapter,  article  60  of  the  Treaty 
expressly  allows  him  to  offer  his  goods  in  a  distant  market  at  the  local  price  if  he  wishes 
to  do  so,  unless  the  High  Authority  issues  a  decision  limiting  this  freedom.)  The  extent  to 
which  a  producer  wi1l  be  prepared  to  reduce  his  price,  net  of  transport  costs,  in  this  way 
depends on the level of his prime costs, and one element in these is, of course, the turnover tax. 
Under  system  a  the  turnover  tax  would  represent  the  same  proportion  (20 %)  of  the 
price  which  a  seller would ask in  the market of F, whether the  steel  were  produced in  F  or 
in  D; and the  same  would  be  true for  steel  sold  in  the  market of D, though  the  percentage 
would  be lower.  Consequently,  under  this  system the producers  would  be equally  placed  for 
cutting their f.o. b.  prices to  distant customers, so  far as  the turnover tax is concerned. 
Under  system  b,  however;  the  position  would  be  different.  For  producers  in  F  the 
turnover tax would represent 20%  of the  price in  both markets,  and for  producers in  D 7%. 
It might well  be  that producers in  D paid much more  in direct  taxes,  or  suffered from  some 
other  handicap,  so  that  in  times  of  normal trade each quoted  the  same  price  ex-works  and ~ 
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could sell  over the same sort of area.  But these direct  taxes  do  not enter into prime costs,  so 
that  producers  in  D  would  be  better  able  to  extend  their  market  by  selling  at local  prices 
if a  trade depression made this necessary. 
The shifting of the market's geographical points of- equilibrium may thus be represented 
as  follows: 
F  D 
~- ·-------falling  market 
--------->- rising  market 
The  enterprises in  F  will  feel  the  effects  of  the varying  trade conditions  more  strongly 
than  the  enterprises in  D;  this  will  result  in  a  bigger  reduction  of  the  quantities  sold  by  the 
enterprises  in F,  or will  make  it  necessary  for  them  to  lower  their  variable  costs  more  sub-
stantially. CHAPTER  V 
FINAL REMARKS AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Before summarizing its conclusions,  the  Committee wishes  to  draw  the attention of  the 
High  Authority  to  a  few  points  which  arose in  the  course of its  work,  because  they  have  a 
certain  bearing  on the  problems  under consideration. 
It would  first  like  to  point  out  that  an  explanation  of  the  operation  of  a  common 
market entails  several  different conceptions of price:  the  net  price  to  the  producer,  the  gross 
price  to  the  producer,  the  price paid  by  the  purchaser,  etc.  (see  chapter  II).  All  these  con-
ceptions are significant economically, some have also a legal  significance.  The Treaty does  not 
always  indicate clearly to  which  of  these conceptions  it  refers. 
In the  second place,  the Committee  would like to  point out that the  difficulties caused 
by  the  differences  in  the  taxation  systems  would  be  eliminated  if  it  were  possible  to  carry 
out a gradual assimilation  of the  rates in force  in  the different countries. 
The Committee did not consider that it  was  within  its  competence to  examine in detail 
whether the adoption of one of the systems would increase or reduce the  danger of undesirable 
disturbances in  the common market,  such  as  would  result if  the  Governments of the member 
countries tried to  give their producers or consumers a competitive advantage by "manipulating" 
the  rates  or the  basis  of  their  taxes,  refunds  and  compensating  duties.  The  attention  of  the 
High  Authority should,  however,  be  drawn  to  the following  points: 
a)  If the "ideal" version of system a were adopted, it would necessarily be very difficult 
to  calculate  the  appropriate  refunds  and  compensating  duties;  in  fact,  even  for  a 
single  product,  it  would  be  necessary  to  use  several  rates,  the  amounts  of  which 
would  depend on  factors  such  as  the  number of previous  transactions,  the method 
of delivery, etc. 
A situation of this kind would give the Government a free hand to  apply abnormally 
high or low  rates, and there would be little possibility of controlling them. 
b)  If system b were adopted, the Governments could alter the tax rates for  one or more 
products, especially in those countries, where the rate is not uniform.  (In France, the 
rates  of  the  production  tax  - "taxe a la  production"  - on  coal  and  steel  differ 
widely at present;  they amount to  about 5 and 15 % respectively.) This is even more 
likely with the system of a tax on the value added, since under this system the refund 
of taxes paid at earlier  stages  means  that the rate of tax  levied  in  advance  on the 
intermediate products is  of small importance for  transactions within  the country. 
c)  Under system a'  the rules  are  reasonably clear. 
Although this last conclusion might not appear very important in  regard to the economic 
problems  with  which  we  are  dealing  here,  nevertheless  it has  a  political  significance  for  the 
Community. 
All  the  member countries  at present exempt exports  from  indirect  taxes  levied  at the 
final stage;  they  all follow  the system whereby direct taxes are levied  by the country of origin. , 
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As regards indirect taxes at the  penultimate  and earlier stages,  they normally follow  the prin-
ciple  of  non-reimbursement.  Some  of them,  however,  allow  complicated  refunds  which  cover 
only a  small part of the tax;  such refunds  do  not help  to  assimilate  the effective levels  of the 
tax in  the different countries. 
These practices, therefore, create legal inequalities and complications which by no means 
assist the  formation  of a common market; they are also likely  to  change  according to  circum-
stances,  and the High  Authority  has  no  criterion  on which  to  resist  such  changes.  One  may 
therefore,  ask  whether  tax  exemptions  on  exports  should  not  be  strictly  limited  to  indirect 
taxes for  which, under system  a,  the assessment is  based on the final transaction. This  would 
have  the  advantage  of  laying  down  a  simple  legal  norm,  without  making  any  undesirable 
changes  in  the  existing  economic  position. 
Having  made  these  observations,  the  Committee  would  now  like  to  summarize  its 
conclusions in  the form of answers  to  the  questions  put by  the  High  Authority;  the  answers 
will  be set out in the numerical order of the questions. 
5.1  As  regards  the  long-term  consequences  for  the  operation  of  the common  market,  the 
essential fact is  that system b  - which is  applied both in respect of direct taxes and to certain 
elements  of  indirect  taxation  - tends  to  distort  the  allocation  of  economic  resources  when 
it  is  applied only  to  a  section  of  the  economy  (1),  whereas  system  a  does  not  interfere  with 
the proper utilization of the resources.  The Committee has worked out a few  examples  of the 
distortions which would arise from the application of system b. These distortions are particularly 
. prominent in the  case  of  the  French processing  industries,  on account  of  the  basis  used for 
levying  the  French  production  tax  - "taxe a la  production".  On  the  other  hand,  system  a 
suffers from some defects, when exemptions, refunds or compensation duties cover only  a part 
of the whole tax burden. These defects are not very serious at present, because in any particular 
country the compensated portion is  probably about the same for most products. 
Apart from  the  long-term  consequences  there  may  be  temporary  consequences,  when 
there is  a  sudden change in circumstances. These may arise  simply through  the establishment 
of  the  common  market  - the  Treaty  makes  provision  for  measures  to  be  applied  in  this 
case  - and  they  may  also  arise  through  a  change  in  the  taxation  system.  From the  tables 
submitted  it  is  clear  that  the  present  situation  is  not  appreciably  different  from  system  a' 
(exemption and compensation only of taxes levied at the "final stage"); in this case there would. 
therefore, be no sudden change.  There would,  however,  be  a  sudden change if system a (ideal 
version) or system b  were introduced. 
5.2  In chapter III the  Committee  has  presented  comparative  tables  showing  the  turnover 
taxes,  present  practices  in  regard  to  tax  exemptions  on  exports  and  compensating  duty  on 
imports  of  certain  important products  within  the  scope  of  the  E.C.S.C.  (see  tables  IA.  IB, 
IIA,  liB). 
5.3  On the  basis  of  these figures  an estimate was  made in  section  3.4  of  the  effect  which 
current practices  have on prices.  The primary effect  of  a  possible change  in the  system  may 
(1)  If system  b  were applied only to one part of the  economy,  there is  only one case  in  which  it  would 
cause no distortion, namely if all countries of the Community adopted the same rate and the same hasis of 
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thus be determined (cf.  section  3.5).  The primary tendency  will  be towards  an expansion of 
the markets of the favoured  sellers and a  restriction of the markets open to those sellers  who 
are put at  a  disadvantage.  It will  probably  be  followed  by  a  price  adjustment  which  must 
be carefully distinguished from the effect on prices of the establishment of the common market 
or of the economic situation. 
5.4  The tables included in chapter III reveal that tax exemptions, as well  as  compensating 
duties,  are  everywhere  lower  at  present  than  the  total  incidence  of  turnover  taxes.  This 
incidence is  generally  underestimated,  because  the incidence  in  the  earlier stages  is  who1ly  or 
partially overlooked. 
5.5  In practice, exemption is  not applied to other taxes. 
Luxembourg,  8th  April,  1953 
J.  TINBERGEN,  Chairman 
L. DUPRIEZ  } 
A. or  FENIZIO 'Members 
B.  REDDAWAY} 
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SUMMARY 
1.  BASIC  CONCEPTS 
On the  5th  of  May  1953  the  High  Authority  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Com-
munity  appointed  a  Committee  of  Experts  to  which  it  submitted  in  particular  the  following 
question: 
"Having regard  to  the  differences  in  the  turnover  taxes  levied  in  the  various  countries 
of  the  Community  what  would  be  the  economic  effects  on  the  operation  of  the  common 
market: 
a)  of a system a  which, by exemptions for exports and compensating duties on imports, 
would  result  in  the  products  being  liable  to  turnover  tax  only  in  the  country  of 
destination; 
.b)  of a  system  b  under which  the  products,  wherever  they  might  be  delivered  within 
the  common  market,  would  be  liable  only  to  the  turnover  taxes  of  the  countries 
of  origin?" 
Before answering this question  the Committee recalls that the aim of a common marA.et 
ts  to  supply  requirements  as  cheaply as  possible,  which  implies  the  following  characteristics: 
1.  the  net  prices  quoted  by  a  given  seller  at  any  particular  point  of  dispatch  are 
the same for all buyers; 
2.  every  buyer always chooses the seller whose price to  him is  the  lowest  at  the  point 
of delivery. 
These  characteristics  of  the  common  market  can  be  found  in  the  provisiOns  of  the 
Treaty, although the different concepts of price are not always  explicitly defined. 
In  order  that  every  buyer  may  select  the  seller  who  is  the  cheapest  for  him,  it  is 
essential that tax  considerations  do not intervene  to  alter his  decisions. 
2.  BASIC  EFFECTS  OF  SYSTEMS  A  AND B  ON  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
The Committee  points  out  that  system  b has  been  generally  adopted  for  direct  taxe~ 
and that system a is  customary for indirect  taxes. 
However,  system  b  is  also  conceivable  for  a  general  turnover  tax  if  the  same  rate  is 
adopted in every country  and  applies  to  all  products  and to  trade  with  all  countries.  But  it 
would  be incompatible  with  the  common  market  to  apply  system  b  only  to  coal  and  steel. 
In that case  there would be  a  disequilibrium  between  the charges  on coal  and  steel  in  com-
parison with the charges  on  other products,  including even  products  made of  coal  and  steel. 
The Committee gives a few  examples of distortions which would be created if the two  systems 
were applied at the same time.  The countries with a  high rate would be artificially  induced to 
concentrate  their  production  on  articles  not  falling  within  the  scope  of  the  Community  and 
to import coal and steel. In the countries with a low rate the opposite effect would be obtained. _...,_. 
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Certain finished products beyond the competence of the Community could even become 
cheaper  than  the  raw  materials  they  are  made  of,  if they  were  transferred  from  a  country 
with a  high  rate to  a country with  a  low  rate. 
The adoption of system  b  for  the  coal  and  steel  sector only  would  therefore  result  in 
distortions detrimental to the most rational allocation of the productive resources, which would 
be incompatible with the aim of the common market. 
System a  when  adopted for the whole  of  the economy,  creates  no  distortions  but it is 
practically impossible to apply it in all details:  to  exempt the products from the precise amount 
of the taxes paid during the whole  process of production would require extremely complicated 
calculations  for  each  different  case.  Therefore  the  Committee  recommends  the  adoption  of 
a simple version of system a,  under which the exemptions or refunds are limited to the amount 
of  the  tax  on  the  final  transaction.  This  version  would  be  easy  to  apply  and  to  control. 
Moreover  it  comes  nearest  to  the  current  practices  so  that  its  adoption  would  not  create 
sudden  changes. 
3.  GENERAL  REMARKS 
As  far  as  direct  taxes  are  concerned,  which  may  be  higher  or lower  in  the  different 
countries,  the  Committee  points  out  that  the  level  of  these  taxes  is  not  relevant  for  the 
consideration  of the  different  systems  of  turnover  tax.  These  direct  taxes  affect  all products 
and  therefore  they create  no  distortions.  The differences  between  the level  of  these  taxes  as 
well  as  the  differences  between  the  general  conditions  in  the  various  countries  are  reflected 
amongst other things in a  certain equilibrium  exchange rate. 
The Committee makes the  following  observation about the possible  adoption of  a  new 
taxation  system  at the  same  time  as  the  establishment  of the  common  market.  In this  case 
it  would  be  necessary  to  distinguish  clearly  between  the  effects  of  the  adoption  of  the  new 
taxation  system  as  such  and  the  effects  of  the  establishment  of  the  common  market.  It is 
essential  to  determine  whether  the  changes  in  the  allocation  of  productive  resources.  which 
the  taxation system itself causes  in the long run,  are  desirable or not.  Apart from  these long-
term  consequences  there  may  be  temporary  effects  (not  only  due  to  changes  in  the  fiscal 
system)  whenever  a  sudden  change  of  circumstances  occurs.  These  short-term  consequences 
can,  if  necessary,  be  mitigated.  This  case  may  arise  even  through  the  establishment  of  the 
common  market~ the Treaty contains provisions for  this  eventuality. 
The essential point is,  however, to  determine how  the allocation of productive resources 
will be influenced in the long run by  ~he change under consideration. 
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REFERENCE  KEY 
Symbols 
greater  than  ... 
nil 
case-dees  not  arise 
*  . . . . . . . . . . percentages marked with an asterisk are  not applied 
precisely in accordance with either of the two  systems 
(cumulative and non-cumulative) 
Colours 
The black figures relate to the calculation of the incidences. 
The  red figures  hnxe been taken.  or deduced. from  the memommla 
submit.ted to the Committee. 
The green  figures  are  of an  informative  nature,  and are  not  used 
for  a  separate  calculation of incidences. 
EXPLANATORY  NOTES 
(l)  For each country, the figures in the first column represent percentages 
of the selJing price, exclusive of tax. 
( 2)  The  figures  denoted by  (2)  in  the second  column for  each  country 
represent percentages of the selling price, inclusive of tax. 
(3)  The  figures  denoted by  (3)  in the  second  column for  each  country 
represent percentages of the price carriage paid. 
(4)  For coal supplied to coking plants working for  export, the rate  has 
been deduced to 1.8 %- In certain cases and under special conditions, 
it will  be reduced to 4.5 °  /oo,  as for instance in the case of sales by 
a producer to an export merchant; there are also single-stage flat rates. 
(5)  Home-produced  coal  which  is  not destined for  use  in the iron and 
steel industry is  subject to a  single-stage flat rate of 4 %. 
( 6)  As  an  exception to the  general  rule  of a  cumulative rate of 3 %, 
coking fines,  coke and all other imported mineral fuels which are not 
destined for  use in the  iron  and steel  industry,  are subject to tax 
at a single-stage flat rate of 5.5 %. 
(7)  Direct  deliveries  to private individuals  are at present  subject to  a 
rate of 6 %- Cf.  figure  8. 
(8)  Exemption from tax is  envisaged. 
( 9)  Of the purchase  price. 
(1°)  The  incidence  calculated  on  the  basis  of  estimates  represents  an 
approximate value only (see  Chapter III, 3, 2). 
(11)  Deliveries of prepared pit-timber are exempt. 
(12)  On imported products, the tax is levied on the transport charges to 
the frontier in all cases. 
(13)  The French turnover tax system comprises four classes of taxes :  the 
"taxe a la production"'  the "taxe sur  les  transactions"'  the  "taxe 
locale sur le chiffre d'affaires", as well as comparable taxes on certain 
services.  This table  contains  only the rates of the two  first  named 
taxes,  but the other two classes  of taxes have also  been taken  into 
account in the calculations. The "taxe a la production" is  basically 
a  one-stage (non-cumulative) tax, yet this tax also contains a  cumu-
lative element which varies according to the type of transaction and 
is added to the cumulative element of the "taxe sur les transactions". 
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COMPARATIVE  TABLE  OF  TURNOVER  TAXES,  TAX  EXEMPTIONS,  REFUNDS,  COMPENSATING  DUTIES, 
AND  TAXES  LEVIED  ON  ENTRY  OF  IMPORTS 
(Art.  2,  Sections  2,  3,  4  and 5,  Order  No.  1/53 of the  High  Authority, of March  5,  1953) 
TURNOVER TAXES  GERM:ANY  BELGIUM:  FRANCE  ITALY 
I.  - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - WHOLE-
SALER  - RETAILER  - PRIVATE  INDIVIDUAL. 
Rate: 
1.  - under  a  non-~  i 
cumulative  I 
system  a)  incidence of the  final  stage .............  l  EB  EB 
7,93 (13) l  6,35* (2) 
2.  - under a cumu- '  I  4,17(1)  4  (2)  4,5* (4)  1  (2)  3 *  (  5) 
lative system  ,  b)  estimated incidence of the penultimate stage  1,6  1,7  4,1  1,2 
(the  proportion  of taxable  raw  materials and 
services  in the  cost  price  of  the  products  is 
taken  as 40 %). 
c)  estimated incidence  of the previous  stages  1,6  1,7  2  1,2 
(the  proportion of taxable  raw materials and 
services  in the  cost  price  of  the  penultimate 
II  stage and the previous stage is taken as 50 %)-
- estimated total incidence  (10)  .............................  7,4  7,9 
i  14  5,4 
-- total  incidence  according  to  the  memoram1a  ~-nlnnitted to the  I 
Committee  ..............................................  >  7  >  G,l 
I  13,os el 
I  ll.  - TRA~SACTIONS BETWEEN  WHOLESALER  AND:  MANUFACTURER  --- RE-
TAILER  - PRIVATE  INDIVIDUAL. 
Rate : 
I 
1.  - under a  non-cumulative system  ...........................  EB  EB  \  6,35* (2 
7. !)3  2.  - under  a  cumulative system ... . . ......... . . ...... .........  - - 0,45 (  ~)  i  1  (2  3 * (;;)  (  6) 
III.- TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  RETAILER AND  PRIVATE  INDIVIDUAL. 
Rate: 
1.  - under a  non-cumulative system ..................... ......  ,..,.,  8) 
) 
6,35* e  - (5)  (6)  \.I:! 
(2)  I  I 
2.  - under a  cumulative system  ............................. . .  4,17 (1)  4  - 7,93 
I  (2 
TAX EXEMPTION  ON  EXPORTS 
I.  - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND:  1\IANUFACTURER- DEALER 
1  - 6,35* (2)  Rate  ......  - 4,17(1)  -4  (2)  -4,5  - 7,93  I - 1  EB 
II.  - TRA:KSACTIONS BETWEEN  DEALERS  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER.  1 - 6,35* (2 
Rate  ......  - - - 0,45  - 7,93  I - I 
z::-, 
TAX  REFUNDS  ON  EXPORTS  I 
I.  - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER  I  I  I  Rate ...... 
I  -0,5 
I  e  EB  EB  EB 
II.  - TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN WHOLESALER AND: MA:KUFACTURER- DEALER.  - 3,68(3)/ j  (TJ  (f)  E8  EB  Rate  ......  - 0,5  (3)\ I 
TOTAL INCIDENCE ON EXPORTS 
- Estimate  based  on the  calculations  of the  Committee  (10)  ••••••••••• 
I 
2,7  3,4  6,1 
I 
(f) 
- E.stimate  ua8crl  on  the  11/0IIOi'Onda  SfllJinillcrl  to  t/, e  Crmunittee .......  >  ~.3  >  J .U 
COMPENSATING DUTY OR TAX  LEVIED  ON  ENTRY OF  %~eo~-~~. ·I 
I 
4  (  3)  II  I 
4,5  (3)  II  I 
8 
(
3
)  II  I 
3  (12)  (6)  11 
Table I  A 
HARD  COAL 
LUXEM.BOURG  NETHERLANDS 
E8  EB  E8  E8 
E8  EB  4,17  4 (2)  (7) 
E8  EB  1,5 {11) 
E8  EB  1,6 
EB  EB  7,3 
E£·  EE- EB  EB 
0,5  0,5  I  3,1  (  3 (  2) ( s) ~~~is;~~~;~ 
I  - (-uomanufacturers) 
EB  EB  EB  (f.! 
2,04  2  3,1  3  (2)  (8) 
I 
EB  EB  - 4,17  - 4 (2) 
@  EB  - --
EB  EB  - -
(£)  EB  - 4 (9) 
EB  EB  3,1 
I 
2 (3) 
II  I 
4 (3)  (7) 11 
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> 
EB 
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REFERENCE  KEY 
Symbols 
greater  than ... 
.......... nil 
. . . . . . . . . .  case  does  not arise 
. . . . . . . . . .  cannot  be  estimated 
. . . . . . . . . .  rates marked with an asterisk are not applied precisely 
in acwrdance with either  of the  two  systems (cumu-
lative and non-cumulative). 
Colours 
The black figures relate to the calculation of the incidences. 
The  red figures  have been taken,  or deduced, from the  memoranda 
submitted to the Committee. 
The green figures are of an informative nature, and are not used for 
a  separate calculation of incidences. 
EXPLANATORY  NOTES 
(1)  For each country, the figures in the first column represent percentages 
of the selling price, exclusive of tax. 
(2)  The  figures  denoted  by  (2)  in the second  column  for  each  country 
represent percentages  of the selling  price,  inclusive  of  tax. 
(3)  The  figures  denoted  by  (3)  in the second  column  for  each  country 
represent percentages of the price carriage paid. 
(4)  For coal  supplied to coking  plants working for  export, the rate has 
been reduced to 1.8 %, which is equivalent to an additional exemption 
of approx. 1.3 o/o. 
(6)  Home-produced  coal  which  is  not  destined for  use in the iron  and 
steel industry is  subject to a  single-stage flat rate of 4 o/o. 
(6)  As  an exception  to  the  general  rule  of a  cumulative rate  of 3 %, 
coking fines,  coke and all other imported mineral fuels which are not 
destined  for  use  in  the iron and steel  industry,  are  subject  to tax 
at a  flat rate of 5.5 o/o. 
(7)  Deliveries to private individuals are at present subject to a  rate of 
6 o/o.  Of.  figure  (8). 
( 8)  Exemption from tax is envisaged. 
(9)  Of the purchase price. 
(1°)  Sales  effected by producers are subjected to a  rate of 4.5 % ; where 
a  coke  producer  has  himself  bought  the  coal  treated  by him,  the 
sales effected by him are exceptionally subject to a  rate of 4.5 o /00  ; 
all  subsequent  sales  through  purchasing dealers  are also  subject to 
a  rate of 4.5 °/00•  There are also single-8tage flat rates. 
(11)  The  incidence  calculated  on  the  basis  of  estimates represents  an 
approximate value only (see Chapter III, 3, 2). 
(12)  The details of the French turnover tax system given under figure  (13) 
in Table I-A apply also to this table. 
(1 8)  On imported products, the tax is levied on the transport charges to 
the frontier in all cases. 
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COMPARATIVE  TABLE  OF  TURNOVER  TAXES,  TAX  EXEMPTIONS,  REFUNDS,  COMPENSATING  DUTIES, 
Table I  B 
COKE 
AND  TAXES  LEVIED  ON  ENTRY  OF  IMPORTS 
(coke  produced  by  an independent  coking plant) 
(Art.  2,  Sections  2,  3,  4  and 5,  Order  No.  I/53  of the  High Authority, of March  5,  1953) 
TURNOVER  TAXES  GERMANY  BELGIUM  FRANCE  ITALY  LUXEMBOURG  NETHERLANDS 
I. - TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PRODUCER AND:  MANUFACTURER  - WHOLE- I  II  II  II  II 
SALER- RETAILER- PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL  ---------
Rate: 
I. - under  a  non- ~~ 
cumulative 
system 
2.  - under a  cumu-
tive system  1 
a) incidence  of the  final  stage ..............  { 
b)  estimated  incidence  of  the  penultimate 
stage  ................................  . 
(the  proportion of taxable  raw  materials and 
services  in the  cost  price  of  the  products  is 
taken  as  80 %) 
c)  estimated incidence of a  second stage ..... 
(in  which  the  proportion  of  taxable  raw 
materials and services in the  cost  price of the 
penultimate  stage  is  40 % (see  Table  1-A, 
Hard  Coal) 
d)  estimated incidence  of the previous  stages 
(the  proportion  of  taxable  raw materials and 
1 
services  in the  cost  price  of the  second  stage 
and  the  previous  stages  is  taken  as  50 %) 
- estimated total incidence (11)  •••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
- total incidence  according  to  the  memoranda  submitted to the 
Committee  ..............................................  . 
II.  - TRAXSACTIOXS  BETWEEK  WHOLESALER  AXD:  MANUFACTURER  ---
RETAILER  - PRIVATE  IXDI\TDIJAL. 
Rate: 
l.  under a  non-cumulative  system ......... .................  . 
~.  under  a  cumulative system ...... ...... . .. .... . .. ........  . 
III.  -- TRAXSACTIOXS  BET\\'EEX  HET.\lLER  AND  PRIVATE  INDIVIDUAL. 
Rate: 
l.  under  a  non-cumulative  system .............. . ...... . .. . . . 
·)  under  a  cumulative  syste~1 ........ ............... ..... . . . 
TAX  EXEMPTION  ON  EXPORTS 
I. - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER 
Rate .......  . 
i I,  TR\XSACTIONS  BET\YEEX  DEALER  AXD  :  YlANUFACTl~RER  -···- DEALER 
Rate ... .... . 
TAX  REFUNDS  ON  EXPORTS 
I.  - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND:  MANUFACTURER- DEALER 
Rate .......  . 
!I. -- TRAXSACTIOXS  BET\VEEX  DEALER  AKD  :  1\IAKUFACTURER  DEALER 
Rate .... . .. . 
TOTAL INCIDENCE ON  EXPORTS 
- Estimate  based  on the  calculations of the  Committee (11) •••••••••••••• 
- Estimate based on the memoranda submitted to  the  Committee .........  . 
COMPENSATING  DUTY,  OR TAX  LEVIED  ON  ENTRY  OF  IMPORTS 
Rate .......  . 
penultimate  stage  is  assumed  to  be  60%  the  Total m01dence  · · · · ..... 
NOTE : For a  colliery with its own coking plant (the ~  .  . 
previous stages 50 o/o).  o•  Total incidence on exports 
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EB  EB 
EB  (fl 
ffi  EE• 
o,5  o,s (2)  Ill 
EB  ffi 
:?,04  2 
ttl 
EB 
ttl 
ffi 
EB 
EB 
ttl 
ttl 
ffi 
ffi 
tt' 
ttl 
2 (3) 
I 
EB  ttl 
4,17  4 (2)  (7) 
3,2 
1,2 
1,2 
9,8 
ffi 
3,1 
ffi 
3,1 
- 4,171 
- 3,431 
- >  4  (") 
2,2 
9 
4,8 
EB 
{
3(2)(R) (to_pci.,te) 
lrHflviduals) 
--(tomanufacturers] 
8 
3 (2)  (') 
-4  (2) 
4 (3)  (1) .. 
I  l 
I 
I  \ 
i  ' 
> 
EB 
* 
REFERENCE  KEY 
Symbols 
greater  than  ... 
nil. 
case  does  rwt  arise. 
rates marked with an asterisk are not applied precisely 
in accordance with either of the two systems (cumulative 
and non-cumulative). 
Colours 
The black figures  relate to the calculation of the incidences. 
The red figures have been taken, or deduced, from the memoranda 
submitted to the Committee. 
The green figures are of an informative nature, and are not used for 
a  separate  calculation of incidences. 
EXPLANATORY  NOTES 
(1)  For each country, the figures in the first column represent percentages 
of the selling price, exclusive of tax. 
( 2)  The  figures  denoted  by (2)  in the second  column for  each  country 
represent percentages of the selling price, inclusive of tax. 
(3)  The figures  denoted  by (3)  in the second  column for  each  country 
represent percentages of the price carriage paid. 
( 4)  In certain cases  which are subject to special  conditions,  the rate is 
reduced to 4.5 o /00•  There are also single-stage flat rates. For iron ore 
the rate is  1.8 %. 
(5)  The incidences calculated on the basis of estimates represent appro-
ximate values only (see  Chapter III, 3,  2). 
{6)  These refunds are intended  to cover the incidence of the tax on the 
raw materials ; they are calculated on the purchase price  and must 
not exceed  fixed  maximum rates. 
(1)  Of the purchase price. 
(B)  On imported products, the tax is  levied on the transport charges to 
the frontier in all cases. 
( 9)  The details of the French turnover tax system given under figure  13 
in Table 1-A apply also  to Table II-A. 
(1°)  The proportion  of 70 % of raw materials  and services  in the  cost 
price would not meet the case of an integrated iron and steel plant 
with its own  coking plant and for iron ore mine. 
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Table II A 
COMPARATIVE  TABLE  OF  TURNOVER  TAXES,  TAX  EXEMPTIONS,  REFUNDS,  COMPENSATING  DUTIES, 
BILLETS 
AND  TAXES  LEVIED  ON  ENTRY  OF  IMPORTS 
as an example of crude steel 
(Art.  2,  Sections  2,  3,  4  and 5,  Order  No.  1/53  of the  High Authority, of March  5,  1953) 
LUXEMBOURG  NETHERLANDS  TURNOVER  TAXES  I  GERMANY  II  BELGIUM  II  FRANCE  ITALY  I 
I.- TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND:  MANUFACTURER- DEALER  11---------
Rate: 
I. - under  a  non- ~· 
cumulative 
system  ~  a) incidence of the 
2.  - under a cumu-
lative system 
final  stage  . . . . . . . . . . · · ·l 
b)  estimated  incidence  of  the  penultimate 
stage  ................................  . 
(the  proportion of  taxable  raw  materials and 
services  in the  cost  price  of  the  product  is 
taken  as  70 %) (10) 
EB 
4,17 (1) 
2,8 
2,8  c)  estimated incidence of the previous stages .. 
(the  proportion of taxable  raw  materials and 1  1 
services  in the  cost  price  of  the  penultimate 
stage and the previous stages is taken as 50 %) 
- estimated total incidence (5)  •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  9,8 
- total incidence  according  to the memoranda submitted to  the 
EB 
4 * (2)  4,5 * ( 4) 
2,2  (4) 
3 
9,7 
Committee  .............................................  .  9,2  a  13,8ls,sa 13,2(2)11>  7,4 
ll.  - TRA~SACTIONS  BETWEEN  DEALER  AND:  MANUFACTI';RER  - DEALER 
Rate: 
l. - under  a  non-cumulative system  .. .. . .... . . ... ..... .......  .  l-_;! 
2.  - under a  cumulative system  .......... ....... .............  . 
TAX  EXEMPTIONS  ON  EXPORTS 
I. -TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER AND:  MANUFACTURER- DEALER. 
Rate  ...... 1-4,17 (1) 
II.  - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  DEALER  AND  :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALEH 
Rate  ..... 
TAX  REFUNDS  ON  EXPORTS 
I.  - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN PRODUCER  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER. 
Rate  ...... l-0,5 
II.  - TRANSACTIONS  BET\VEEN  DEALER  AND  :  MANlJFACTURER  - Dl'iALF.R 
Ra,te  . . ... 
TOTAL INCIDENCE ON EXPORTS 
- Estimate  based  on the  calculations  of the  Committee  (5) 
- Estimate  based  on  the  memoranda  submitted  to  the  Committee  ...... . 
coMPENSATING  DUTIES, oR TAXES LEVIED ON  ENTRY  o~.:.O~Ts 
1 
5,1 
4,5 a 9,1 
6j 
-4  (2) 
- 3,f>S  (3) I 
-0,5  (3)  \ 
4 (3) 
II 
0,45 (') 
-4,5  (4) 
-0,45 (· 1) 
EB 
8 
5,2 
>  2,9 
19,55 (9) 
4,4 
5 
29 
19,55 
-19,55 
- 19,55 
EB 
EB 
i 
II  I 
9,4 
4,5  (3)  11 
} 15,35*(2) 
l  1  (2) 
24,19 (2) 
\1 5,35 * (2) 
)  1  (2) 
l-15,35* (2) 
l- 1  (2) 
~ lii . 35 * (2) 
ti  (2) 
EB 
EB 
3 
2 
2 
7 
6,96 
(::;\ 
3 
EB 
-3 
±' 
-3 
EB 
EB  ~ 
II 
I 
20 (3)  II 
4 
3,96 
3 (B) 
EB 
2,04 
1,4 
1,4 
4,8 
2,8 
EB 
0,5 
-2,04 
-0,5 
EB 
EB 
2,8 
0,8 
EB 
2 (2) 
EB 
0,5 (2) 
-2  (2) 
- 0,5 (2) 
EB 
(fl 
2  (3)  II 
EB 
4,17 
2,8 
2,8 
9,8 
>  6,4 
EB 
-4,17 
- 0,8(6) 
-·  4  (7)t 
-0,8  ( 6 ~ 
4,8 
>  1,4 
EB 
4 (2) 
E D 
-4  (2) 
4 (3) • 
f-
I 
• 
> 
EB 
* 
' 
REFERENCE  KEY 
greater  than  ... 
nil. 
Symbols 
case  does  not arise. 
rates marked with an asterisk are not applied precisely 
in accordance with either of the two systems (cumulative 
and non-cumulative)  . 
Colours 
The black figures  relate to the calculation of the incidences. 
The red figures  have been taken, or deduced, from the memoranda 
submitted to  the  Committee. 
TltP  gr('cn  figures :1re of an informrttive nat nrP, and rtre  not. uF>cd  for 
a  :-;epa.ra Le  ea  le- t~ !a tion  of  ineitlPnccs. 
EXPLANATORY  NOTES 
(1 )  For each country, the figures in the first column represent percentages 
'lf the selling price, exclusive of tax. 
(2)  The  figures  denoted  by  (2} in the second  column  for  each  country 
represent percentages of the selling price, inclusive of  tax. 
(3)  The  figures  denoted by  (3)  in the  second  column for  each  country 
represent percentages of the price carriage paid. 
(4)  In certain cases  which are subject to special  conditions,  the rate is 
reduced to 4.5 o /00•  There  are  also  single-stage  fiat  rates.  For iron 
ore the rate is 1.8 %-
(1')  The incidences calculated on the basis of estimates represent appro-
ximate values only (see  Chapter III, 3,  2). 
( 6)  These refunds are intended to cover the incidence of the tax on the 
raw materials ; they are calculated on the purchase price and must 
not exceed  fixed  maximum rates. 
(')  Of the purchase price. 
( 8)  The French turnover tax system comprises four classes of taxes : the 
"taxe a la production"'  the "taxe sur  les  transactions"'  the "taxe 
locale  sur  le  chiffre  d'affaires",  as  well  as  similar  taxes  on  certain 
services.  This  table contains  only the rates of the two  first  named 
taxes but the other two  classes  of taxes have also  been taken  into 
account in the calculations.  The "taxe a la production" is basically 
a  one-stage (non-cumulative) tax, yet this tax also contains a  cumu-
lative element which varies according to the type of transaction and 
must be added to the cumulative element of the "taxe sur les trans-
actions". 
( 9)  On imported products, the tax is levied on the transport charges to 
the frontier in all cases. 
(1°)  The  proportion of 70 % of raw materials  and  services  in the  cost 
price would not meet the case of an integrated iron and steel plant 
with its own coking plant and  for  iron ore mine. 
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COMPARATIVE  TABLE  OF  TURNOVER  TAXES,  TAX  EXEMPTIONS,  REFUNDS,  COMPENSATING  DUTIES, 
I 
I 
AND  TAXES  LEVIED  ON  ENTRY  OF  IMPORTS 
(Art.  2,  Sections  2,  3,  4  and 5,  Order  No.  lj53 of the  High Authority, of March  5,  1953) 
TURNOVER TAXES  GERMANY 
I. - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND:  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER 
Rate: 
1.  - under  a  non-
cumulative 
system 
2.  under a  cumu-
lative system I  a) incidence  of the final stBJle  . . . . . . . . . . . l 
\ 
b)  estimated  incidence  of  the  penultimate 
stage  . ............... ............... . . 
(the  proportion of taxable  raw  materials and 
services  in the  cost  price  of  the  product  is 
taken as  70 %.) 
c)  estimated incidence of an analogous second 
EB 
4,17 (1) 
2,8 
stage (1°)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,9 
d)  estimated incidence of the previous stages. .  1,  9 
(the  proportion of taxable  raw materials and 
services in the  cost  price  of the  second  stage 
and  the  previous  stages  is  taken  as  50 %·) 
estimated total incidence (5)  •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  10,8 
- total incidence  according  to the  memoranda submitted to  the 
EB 
4 (2) 
I 
BELGIUM 
4,5 * ( 4) 
3 
1,5 (4) 
2 
ll 
Committee  .........................................  , ... .  8,3 a 13,8!8 a 13,2  e ~ l  >  7,4 
"I I,  - TRAl'SAC'l'LOXfl  Hl ~TWEEN DEALER  AND :  l\I"ANUFACTURER  DEALER 
Rate: 
l .  - undee  a  non-cumulative system  . . ... . . . . . . . ..... . . . .. . ... .  E8  EB 
2.  under  a  cumulative  !'<ystcm  ... . . . . . . . .. ... . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. .  - o,45 e> 
TAX  EXEMPTIONS  ON  EXPORTS 
I I. - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER 
Rate  . . . . .  -4,17 (1)  -4(2)  - 4,5 (4) 
II.  - 'l'RA NSAC'l'IONS  BETWEEN  D  ~ ~ i\LER AND  :  l\!AKIJ  1•' .-\CTI' R I~H - DEALER  . 
Rate  .. . . .  ~ -- 0,45 (I) 
TAX  REFUNDS ON  EXPORTS 
I. - TRANSACTIONS  BETWEEN  PRODUCER  AND :  MANUFACTURER  - DEALER 
Rate  ..... -I  EB 
FRANCE 
19,55 (8)1  ~15,35 * (2) 
(  1  (2) 
EB 
3 
II 
4,4 
II 
3 
3,4 
30,4 
19,55 
-19,55 
- 19,55 
I 
EB  I 
~ 15,35* (
2
) 
I  (2) 
2 
1,4 
1,4 
7,8 
6,5 
EB 
3 
)-15,35 *  (2)11  3 
1- 1  (2)  -
l  ~ 1 ~ , 3:) *  ~:~ I I - 3 
EB  II  EB 
ITALY 
I 
I 
II.  - 'I'H.-\ NSAi''l'lU NS  H l •!' l' \\"EI~ :'<  DF.AL ER  A;'ill:  :\LINLTli'M''l'l!HJW  - TH:.\ I. EJ{. 
.  :l.fiS(') I  I 
L Ef'-1  11- ~  --·---1 
l+l  (f) 
Ratl'  .... .  I  - 1  el 
1·--·---
TOTAL  INCIDENCE  ON EXPORTS 
- Estimate  based  on  the  calculations  of  the  Committee (6)  •••••••••••• ·[  5,6  I  II  6,5 
I  II 
11 
I  II 
4,8 
I  - Estimate  based  on  the  memoranda 8Ubmitted  to  the  Committee . . . . . . . .  3,1  a 8,6  >  2,9  3,5 
I  COMPENSATING  DUTIES,  OR TAXES LEVIED ON  ENTRY OF  i!::~~~~  I 
6 (3)  II  I  4,5 (3)  II  I  20 (3)  II  I  3 (9) 
Table II B 
HOT-DRAWN PLATES 
of less than  3  mm thickness 
as an  example  of processed steel. 
The plate  maker  is  assumed to  have  bought  the 
crude  steel from  another  enterprise. 
LUXEMBOURG 
EB 
2,04 
1,4 
0,9 
0,9 
5,2 
:l 
EB 
0,5 
11-2,04 
EB 
2 (2) 
EB 
0,5 (2) 
I - 2 (2) 
NETHERLANDS 
ED 
4,17 
2,8 
1,9 
1,9 
10,8 
>  6,2 
EB 
-
ll-4,17 
EB 
4 (2) 
EB 
I I - 4 (2) 
,, - 0,5  J- o,s (2)  II  -
I 
II  EB  I  EB  II- 0,0 (')I 
1 1 --- - ~  --·  - --1 
EB  11 ·-
4  (1)!  - 0,5 (6) 
I 
II 
3,2 
I  II  6,1 
1  >  1,6 
I\  2 (3)  II  4 (3) 
NOTE:  For an integrated enterprise (assuming a  proportion of 70% of taxable raw materials and services in the cost price of plates), the total incidences  and total  incidences on exports,  expressed  in percentages of the selling 
price,  are comparable  with those given for  billets  (see  Table II A). 
I 
I 
I 
I 